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I INTRODUCTION 
Treaty of Waitangi claims and settlements have received much prominence in recent years, 
both from a political and legal point of view. There are number of formal options available 
to Maori who have grievances against Crown action. In recent years direct negotiations 
have become increasingly important methods for dealing with these grievances, and the 
government has been developing its negotiation policies. 
This paper looks at the role direct negotiations play in the area of Treaty claims. Part II 
describes three formal options available to Maori claimants: the Waitangi Tribunal, the 
courts, and remedial legislation. It looks at how they have influenced each other, and, in 
particular, how they can affect direct negotiations. Part III examines Crown negotiation 
policy as contained in the Crown's Proposals published in 1994. Part IV looks at some 
issues of cross-cultural communication as well as constitutional implications flowing from 
the direct negotiation process. The final part draws conclusions regarding the negotiations 
themselves and their relations to other avenues for Treaty of Waitangi grievances. 
This paper attempts to show that none of the institutions of the claims process can be 
looked at in isolation and that they have had considerable interaction. It is also suggested 
that direct negotiations will become increasingly important as methods of claims 
settlement. The paper argues that negotiations between Maori and the Crown are rich in 
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cross-cultural and institutional issues. They cannot be seen merely as bargaining about 
resources, or even rights breaches, but must also be recognised as discussions about 
identity, the status of the parties and ultimately New Zealand' s constitution. 
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II METHODS OF RESOLVING MAORI GRIEVANCES 
The government provides four main avenues for addressing Maori claims of wrongful 
Crown action. These are the Waitangi Tribunal, litigation in the Courts, remedial 
legislation, and direct negotiation with claimants. This part of the paper presents an 
overview of the first three, while the following parts discuss direct negotiations. 
A The Waitangi Tribunal 
1 Jurisdiction 
This Tribunal was established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, and has experienced 
a growth in its powers and influence to become a highly significant institution. Initially its 
scope of inquiry was limited to reporting on whether legislation, or Crown policy, acts or 
omissions after 10 October 1975 breached Treaty principles. 1 Even at this stage though the 
Tribunal regarded itself as having the power to "consider" events before this date, even if it 
could not "investigate" them. In 1985, after the Tribunal began making a notable impact in 
the claims process, an amending Act extended the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to claims 
1 The date on which the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 came into force . 
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from 6 February 1840, enlarged its membership, and empowered it to commission research 
and appoint counsel to represent claimants.
2 
Apart from the Chair up to 16 additional members, both Maori and Pakeha, are appointed 
by the Crown.3 The Tribunal can hear claims from Maori who feel prejudicially affected by 
legislation, policies, acts or omissions of the Crown inconsistent with the principles of the 
Treaty of Waitangi.4 If the Tribunal finds any claim is well founded, it may recommend 
action that the Crown take to compensate for or remove the prejudice.
5 Such 
recommendations can involve broad policy measures as well as compensation through 
transfer of resources or money. In certain cases involving assets transferred to State Owned 
Enterprises in the 1980s, the Tribunal can make binding recommendations.
6 Later 
negotiated settlements made such a power applicable to timber-cutting rights on Crown-
owned plantation forests , and to assets of the state-owned railways, vested by statute in into 
a company similar to a state-owned enterprise. 
7 The power has not yet been exercised, and 
it is generally considered that political pressures would restrict its use. The Tribunal has, 
2 Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act 1985. 
3 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s 4. 
4 Above n 3, s 6(1). 
5 Above n 3, s 6(3)-(4) . 
6 See Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises Act) 1988 
7 Above n 3, ss 8HA-8HJ. The amending enactments are the Crown Forest Assets Act 1989, and the New 
Zealand Railways Corporation Restructuring Act 1990, ss 43-48. 
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however, recently contemplated its use in the Muriwhenua claim, and may well do so for 
some land in Turangi.8 
The Tribunal deals with three types of claims:
9 
(a) historical (past Crown actions); 
(b) contemporary (current Crown actions); 
(c) conceptual ('ownership' of natural resources). 
Historical claims may be major claims involving large tribal losses, or specific claims. 
Historical claims are grouped by districts for combined hearings with specific claims being 
ancillary to the main inquiries. One inquiry and report may involve as many as 30 
individual claims. These claims involve a range of subject-matter involving events prior to 
1985, including Crown and private purchases, effects of the Native Land Court, and 
confiscations. 
Contemporary claims deal with a wide range of issues including resource management , 
Maori language, and economic development. These issues have often been the subject 
matter of court actions, and there has been some interplay between claims before the 
Waitangi Tribunal claims and court actions. Examples include the transfer of assets to State 
8 See A Hubbard " Waitangi fatigue" Sunday Star Times, Auckland, 24 August 1997, C l-C2 . 
9 See ET Durie "Background Paper" (1995) 25 VU WLR 97 . 
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Owned Enterprises in the 1980s, and the 1992 fisheries settlement. Conceptual claims 
involve Maori interest in the use and development of rivers, lakes, foreshores, minerals and 
geothermal resources, or in the outputs from their development. 
2 Bicultural Procedure 
The Waitangi Tribunal's bicultural process is significant.
10 The turning point came in 1982 
during the Motonui-Waitara Claim when the Tribunal held a hearing on the claimants ' 
marae. While the Tribunal holds parts of hearings in non-Maori settings, the marae hearings 
have become a marked feature of proceedings. The Tribunal ' s rationale is that claimants 
feel more at ease, and can provide more effective evidence when they can give testimony in 
Maori, on their tribal lands. The Tribunal members come to the claimants' marae as 
distinguished manuhiri and take over the marae during proceedings. The Tribunal must 
upholds the kawa of the marae while attempting to respect both Maori and Pakeha laws. 
Moreover, women cannot be denied the right to speak. Lawyers, used to court protocol, 
must make some accommodation. 
11 
Despite the efforts towards cultural sensitivity, Boast claims that the Tribunal should not be 
seen as an: "unparalleled example of a bicultural procedure to be offered as a model to the 
10 WH Oliver Claims to the Waitangi Tribunal (Waitangi Tribunal Division, Department of Justice, 
Wellington, 1991) 13-17; ET Durie and GS Orr "The Role of the Waitangi Tribunal and the Development of 
a Bicultural Jurisprudence" ( 1990) 14 NZULR 62, 64-72. 
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rest of the world". 12 Given that the Tribunal is subject to judicial review there could be an 
obligation for it to fully document proceedings, provide opportunity for witnesses to be 
questioned and to preserve impartiality between the Crown and claimants. The Tribunal is 
deemed to be a Commission of Inquiry
13 and proceeds in a manner that is inquisitorial, 
formal and judicialised. Cross-examination does occur, and: "can be elaborate and lengthy, 
and can include challenges to the qualifications and expertise of the witnesses". 
14 The 
Tribunal may commission research and authorise (and fund) the claimants to commission 
research. 15 It analyses historical, anthropological, sociological, economic and other 
evidence. Specialist evidence has been playing an increasingly important role in hearings. 
16 
In considering the claims, the Tribunal has regard to both the English and Maori language 
versions of the Treaty and, for the purposes of the Act, has: "exclusive authority to 
determine the meaning and effect of the Treaty as embodied in the 2 texts and to decide 
issues raised by the differences between them."
17 The Tribunal ' s interpretation of the 
Treaty has involved considering it as an international treaty. 
18 This leads to consideration of 
11 Above n 10, 70. 
12 RP Boast "The Waitangi Tribunal : "Conscience of the Nation" or Just Another Court? ( 1993) 16 UNSWLJ 
223,235. 
13 Above n 3, clause 3 of the Second Schedule. 
14 Above n 12. 
15 Above n 3, clause 5A of the Second Schedule . 
16 Above n 12. 
17 Above n 3, s 5(2). 
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the jurisprudence resulting from treaties with indigenous peoples in other jurisdictions such 
as the United Sates and Canada, as well as instruments of international law, and scholarship 
on interpreting international treaties. 19 
3 How the Tribunal relates to other institutions 
The Tribunal is a creature of statute, and its capabilities have been enhanced and restricted 
by statute. While the tribunal has a good deal of flexibility in defining its own procedures 
and in writing its reports, it must proceed within the limits of an ordinary Act of 
Parliament. As will be discussed the tribunal's powers have been expanded following 
negotiated agreements which were themselves entered into following court rulings. 
Taking claims through the Waitangi Tribunal is a long and costly exercise .. 
20 Under-
funding is often a problem, and delays are long.
21 The Tribunal offers a great deal more 
flexibility than the courts, both in terms of procedure and solutions. Unlike court orders, 
however, Tribunal recommendations are, for the most part, not binding. Often certain 
matters have come before both the courts and the Waitangi Tribunal.
22 The Tribunal itself 
18 W Renwick The Treaty Now (GP Publications, Wellington , 1990) 20-24. 
19 The Tribunal's Orakei Report drew on interpretative principles described in Lord McNair's The Law of 
Treaties. 
20 Ngai Tahu ' s claim, for example, cost $2.4 million , see H Melbourne Maori Sovereignty- The Maori 
Perspective (Hodder Moa Beckett, Auckland, 1995) 155. 
21 Above n 9, 103. 
22 See generally J Munro Maori in the Courts - The Limits of Litigation /987-1995, M Litt Thesis (Law) 
Balliol College, Oxford, 1996. 
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can be a major focus of court cases. In 1991 the New Zealand Maori Council sought 
judicial review of the decision of the Minster of Communications to proceed with 
frequency tender process under the Radiocommunications Act 1989 before the release of a 
Waitangi Tribunal Report on the Maori language.
23 The Court of Appeal held that as a 
matter of administrative law, the Minster was required to wait and consider the Tribunal ' s 
recommendations.24 
Tribunal reports are typically well-reasoned and based on solid evidence. These can give 
claimants a basis for entering into direct negotiations with the Crown. Initially the Tribunal 
makes a report on the facts of the claim. Only if negotiations fail or are not entered into will 
the parties be heard on remedies and the Tribunal will report its recommendations. This 
process thus encourages negotiations to follow factual findings. The tribunal can also 
provide for mediation. However, these provisions appear to have failed due to the Crown' s 
agent, the Crown Law Office, refusing to become involved in the bargaining process.
25 
23 Waitangi Tribunal Te Reo Report (Government Printer, Wellington, 1986) . 
24 Attorney General v New Zealand Maori Council [ 1991] 2 NZLR 129. 
25 l Macduff "Resources, Rights and Recognition - Negotiating History in Aotearoa/New Zealand" ( 1995) 
19/3 Cultural Survival Quarterly 30, 3 I . 
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B Litigation 
1 Direct results 
While The Waitangi Tribunal exists as a body whose primary purpose is investigation of 
Maori grievances, Maori retain the option of taking cases to the courts. There are two main 
bases for claiming at law: common law aboriginal title and the Treaty of Waitangi. 26 
Arguably the jurisprudence of the state's fiduciary duty towards aboriginal people can stand 
alone as a third basis. The notion of fiduciary duty is considered in aboriginal title and 
treaty jurisprudence, particularly in North America. For many years the courts in New 
Zealand refused to recognise the existence of aboriginal title rights and this even put 
themselves in conflict with the Privy Council over this issue.27 Moreover this conflict was 
resolved in part by a provision in the Native Land Act 1909, later continued in another 
statute, which prevented Maori from bringing aboriginal title claims against the Crown, in 
the courts or otherwise, except as provided in any other Act. 28 While this legislative 
impediment was recently removed, there is hardly any land which can be regarded as 
subsisting under uninvestigated aboriginal title. 29 Non-territorial aboriginal title rights in 
26 See P McHugh The Maori Magna Carta (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991 ); RP Boast "Treaty 
Rights or Aboriginal Rights? " [ 1990] NZLJ 32. 
27 See McHugh's discussion, above n 26, 117-122. 
28 Section 84 of the Native Land Act 1909, later included, with wording of an even more comprehensive 
scope, in s 155 of the Maori Affairs Act 1953. For commentary see Boast above n 26. 
29 The Maori Affairs Act 1953 was repealed by the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. Furthermore section 
145 of the latter Act renders "Maori customary land" inalienable. 
11 
New Zealand have traditionally come within statutory regimes, and the New Zealand courts 
have usually needed at least an allusion to these rights before recognising them.30 
Enactments such as the Resource Management Act 1993 and the Fisheries Act 1983 require 
those administering them to take account of traditional Maori usage. In so doing they take 
these resources outside the framework of common law recognition of traditional ownership 
and use regimes 
The second legal basis involves a jurisprudence that has come to the fore over the last 
decade. An early view taken by the New Zealand courts was that the Treaty was merely 
declaratory of rights at common law, that is aboriginal title rights. 31 An early judgment, 
which since gained considerable notoriety, claimed that the Treaty was a mere nullity so far 
as it purported to cede sovereignty since there was no body politic which was capable of 
such cession.32 Throughout most of the colonial period the government and courts attached 
little value to the Treaty. The standard position was explained by the Privy Council in 
Hoani's case - that Treaty rights were unenforceable in court without incorporation into 
statute.33 
30 For instance Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer [ 1986] I NZLR 680 (Maori fishing rights). 
31 R v Symonds (1847) [1840-1932] NZPCC 387(SC). 
32 Wi Parata v Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 New Zealand Jur (NS) SC 72. For a discussion of this aspect of 
the case see K Keith "The Treaty of Waitangi in the Courts" ( 1990) 14 NZULR 37. 
It should be emphasised that this judgment viewed the Treaty as a "simple nullity" as a Treaty of cession . 
Prendergast CJ was not claiming that the Treaty was in all respects a nullity . 
33 Hoani Te Heu Heu Tukino v Aotea District Maori Land Board [ 1941] NZLR 590 (PC). 
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s the Court of Appeal, under the presidency of Sir Robin 
Cooke, gave the Treaty of Waitangi a legal significance not previously recognised. A series 
of cases came before the courts involving the privatization of state assets by the 
government. Transfer of these assets was contested by Maori claimants as it would have 
lessened the resource base the Crown could use to settle claims. The first of these 
groundbreaking cases concerned the State-Owned Enterprise Act 1986 which contained a 
provision stating: " Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is 
inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi" .34 Despite the Act containing 
specific provisions concerning protection mechanisms for claims before the Waitangi 
Tribunal, the court held that the Crown would have to come up with more effective 
measures. This forced the Crown to negotiate with the plaintiffs and to come up with an 
arrangement which was enacted as the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises Act) 1988. As 
mentioned above this gave the Waitangi Tribunal the power to make binding 
recommendations regarding the assets concerned. This new Act was itself applied in a case 
brought by the Tainui Trust Board seeking protection of its claim to coal mining rights.
35 
This litigation was to play a key role in the negotiations between Waikato Tainui and the 
Crown which lead to a major settlement. 36 
34 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney General [ 1987] I NZLR 641. The relevant provision of the Act 
was section 9. 
35 Tainui Maori Trust Board v Attorney General [ 1989] 2 NZLR 513 . 
36 See RTK Mahuta "Tainui : A Case Study of Direct Negotiations" (1995) 25 VU WLR 157. 
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Between 1987 and 1995, Maori groups took 11 major cases to the High Court and the Court 
of Appeal, and two of these went on to the Privy Council.37 Litigation was brought for a 
variety of assets subject to claims by Maori groups and included: fisheries38 , petroleum39, 
forestry4°, broadcasting frequencies4 1, and hyroelectricity.42 Often these related to claims 
supplementary to those for lost land. While no case went as far as ruling that the Treaty 
could be directly enforceable in a New Zealand court, it's effects have been held to be 
significant. In a High Court case it was found that even if there is no mention of the Treaty 
it must be considered in cases impacting upon Maori concerns as it forms part of the fabric 
of New Zealand law.43 
Despite a number of "victories", the direct usefulness of courts for Maori claimants is 
limited. The courts cannot generally make rulings on historical grievances since the land 
title involved will either be with a private person or belong to the Crown. As mentioned 
above aboriginal title is almost redundant in New Zealand. The cases of the 1980s and 
1990s mentioned above concerned process more than substance. No land has yet been 
returned under the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988. Moreover, the Crown 
37 Above n 22. 
38 Te Runanga o Muriwhenua 1 nc v Attorney-General [ 1990] 2 NZLR 641 . 
39 l ove v Attorney-General Unreported , 17 March 1988, High Court Wellington Registry CP 135/88 (HC). 
40 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1989] 2 NZLR 142 
4 1 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General [1992] 2 NZLR 576; New Zealand Maori Council v 
Attorney-General [ 1994] I NZLR 513 . 
42 Te Runanga O Te lka Whenua Inc v Attorney-General [ 1994] 2 NZLR 20. 
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has found ways to avoid the desired effect of the protection mechanisms established by 
transferring land through government departments rather than state owned enterprises, the 
former not being covered by the legislation.44 Munro notes that despite claims of 'judicial 
activism' in the recent Treaty of Waitangi jurisprudence, the courts are constrained by the 
constitutional order and so cannot be revolutionary in their approach.45 Claims brought by 
Maori groups must have a legal rights and can only receive legal remedies. This must be 
contrasted with the flexibility , in terms of processes and solutions, of negotiation, and even 
the Waitangi Tribunal. 
A relatively new area for the courts has been challenge of "settlements" by disaffected 
groups. In the case where direct negotiations have led to an agreement and subsequent 
transfer of assets to claimants, some Maori within the interested group have not been 
satisfied with the result. The most notable example is the "Sealords Deal" whereby the 
Crown attempted a permanent, pan-tribal settlement of commercial fisheries claims. An 
unsuccessful suit was filed in attempt to prevent Parliament from enacting the settlement 
deed. 46 The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries Commission, to which the fisheries quota was 
transferred, has been facing ongoing court cases opposing its distribution models.
4 7 While 
43 Huakina Development Trust v Waikato Valley Authority [ 1987] 2 NZLR 188. 
44 Above n 22, 25. 
45 Above n 22, I 00-110. 
46 Te Runanga o Wahrekauri Rekohu Incorporated v Attorney General [ 1993] 2 NZLR 30 I. 
47 Above n 38; R Berry "Court bid to alter fisheries allocations" Sunday Star Times, Auckland, 
20 July 1997. 
15 
the Commission appears to be approaching an agreement, it faces strong challenges from 
urban Maori groups who would gain nothing under the distribution policy currently 
contemplated.48 
2 Flow-on effects 
Apart from the immediate results, the high profile court cases gave impetus to direct 
negotiations between Maori and the Crown. By giving some legal effect to the Treaty of 
Waitangi, the courts made the government realise that it had an obligation to take action on 
grievances. This mirrors developments in other comparable jurisdictions where court 
decisions have also been a prelude to action by the executive and legislature.
49 A court 
ruling can significantly alter the power imbalance.so Furthermore, litigation impedes the 
execution of policy as well as the standing of the government, which cannot do as it decides 
with its assets. Even the threat of litigation can disrupt executive action. 
Munro notes that success in the courts may have a significant psychological impact on the 
public and the claimant group.s 1 Public awareness of the group's grievance will probably be 
48 See "Fisheries snags looking smaller" The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 29 July 1997, AS ; R Berry 
"Clash mars fisheries hui" Sunday Star-Times, Auckland, 27 July 1997, A4 ; " lwi optimistic over fisheries 
hui" The Press, Christchurch, 28 July 1997. 
49 See C Wickliffe Indigenous Claims and the Process of Negotiation and Settlement in Countries with 
Jurisdictions and Populations Comparable to New Zealand's Background Report for Environmental 
Information and the Adequacy of Treaty Settlement Procedures, Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment, September 1994. 
50 Above n 22, 64-65. 
51 Above n 22, 71-79. 
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enhanced, while the court's recognition of rights may legitimate the claim in the public eye. 
Litigation could also contribute to the claimant group's development in terms of 
politicisation. It may also make members more determined to pursue claims.
52 This 
cohesion and politicisation may put even more pressure on the Crown to respond to the 
grievance. Nevertheless, not everything is positive in this regard either. Litigation can 
stimulate a backlash from those who oppose the claim.
53 Mumo also comments that court 
procedure, with its emphasis on lawyers, and prominent Maori personalities, can have a 
disempowering effect on the claimant group at the grass roots level. 
3 Litigation culture at the negotiating table 
As explained above, litigation and direct negotiation are strongly interwoven. A successful 
court case may be necessary to bring the Crown into negotiations in the first place. 
However, once the parties are engaged in negotiations, the effect of the court is still present. 
Procedure in a courtroom is adversarial, and if this adversarial culture is carried on to the 
negotiating table there are implications on how negotiations will develop. Litigation will 
typically involve a zero-sum gain situation, while in negotiation creative solutions which 
satisfy the needs of both parties are often required. Furthermore lawyers advising claimants 
during negotiations will carry the litigation paradigm through to negotiations. It is observed 
52 See the Comments of Sir Tipene O'Regan in Melbourne, above n 20, 155-156. 
53 See for example SC Scott The Travesty of Waitangi - Towards Anarchy (The Campbell Press, Dunedin, 
1995). 
17 
that both Crown and claimants typically engage in positional bargaining.
54 Locking oneself 
into a particular position undermines the possibility of achieving an appropriate settlement. 
It will be noted later that the Crown' s policy acts to reinforce this suboptimal approach. As 
well as the issue of the approach of the parties, are considerations of substantive law. Direct 
negotiations involve "bargaining in the shadow of the law"
55 and parties know that they can 
always resort to the courts to enforce their legal rights. This will be a consideration for all 
negotiators and can place constraints on their actions and discussions. 
C Legislation 
Even more so than for the other methods for resolving Maori claims, legislation should not 
be looked at in isolation. As mentioned above the Waitangi Tribunal is itself a creature of 
statute and its powers can be expanded and limited by Parliament. The result in 
groundbreaking 1987 New Zealand Maori Council case may not have been possible had the 
relevant statute not stated that its provisions could not be applied inconsistently with the 
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. 56 This case could thus be said to comply with the 
legislative incorporation rule in Hoani 's case.57 
54 Above n 22, 154. 
55 R Mnookin and L Kornhauser " Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce" ( 1979) 88 
Yale LJ 951. 
56 Above n 34. 
57 Above n 33 . 
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The importance of statute in the field of direct negotiations is in respect to codification of 
settlement deeds, and to government policy following a Waitangi Tribunal report or court 
judgment. The interrelation of the various institutions can be seen in respect to the 
aftermath of the first New Zealand Maori Council case, described above. In the context of 
the Crown's present policy of direct negotiation and claims settlement, enactment of the 
settlement deed is a major component. Such enactment is an important part of the well-
developed negotiation and settlement policy in Canada.
58 Legislation can also can also be 
used before a settlement to assist a tribe in terms of organisation and legal personality, as 
evidenced by the Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act 1996. 
58 Above n 49. 
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III NEGOTIATION POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND 
A Background 
Prior to 1989 there was no global Crown policy in relation to direct negotiations of Treaty 
claims. Negotiations and settlements which did occur were ad hoe, the resulting 
"settlements" were often considered inconclusive, and these claims continue today. In 1946 
Prime Minster Fraser concluded a settlement with Tainui elders for compensation - £6,000 
annually for the next 50 years, and £5,000 thereafter in perpetuity. 59 In time, this came to be 
seen as inadequate and the major agreement of 1995 was the result. 
In 1989, following, the first of the high profile court cases mentioned above, the 
Government announced that it would enter into direct negotiations with Maori claiming 
under the Treaty. In 1989 the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit of the Department of Justice 
published Principles for Crown Action on the Treaty of Waitangi. 60 These were the 
principles to guide Executive action as a whole. Five years later, the Office of Treaty 
Settlements, which took over functions of the Treaty of Waitangi Policy Unit, published a 
significant and controversial publication entitled Crown Proposals for the Settlement of 
59 Above n 36. 
6° For background and discussion see A Frame " A State Servant Looks at the Treaty" ( 1990) 14 NZULR 82 . 
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Treaty of Waitangi Claims. As the title implies, these were meant to be proposals to be put 
before Maori for consideration and comment. 
The proposal package, often labeled the "fiscal envelope" was strongly rejected throughout 
Maoridom.6 1 A series of hui throughout the country brought Crown Ministers and officials 
in contact with tribes throughout the country - an unequivocal message of rejection of the 
proposals was conveyed to the government. As well as having objections to the content of 
the Proposals, many Maori were dissatisfied with the manner in which they were 
presented.62 A common criticism was that the Proposals were not developed in consultation 
with iwi. The government did involve Te Puni Kokiri (the Ministry of Maori Development) 
in the formulation of the policies. The Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi 
Negotiations has also stated that it would have taken too long for all the claimants to have 
made their input; Maori opinion was to have been sought following the release of the 
proposals. Some commentators argue that given the cross-cultural context, there should 
have been a joint development of negotiation policy.63 Another criticism was that too little 
time was given for Maori to prepare and present their submissions. Significantly, the 
"Proposals" have largely become the actual policy for Crown action,64 although certain 
features, particularly, the fiscal cap, may be irrelevant with the formation of a new 
61 See W Gardiner Return to Sender (Reed, Auckland, 1996); MH Durie "Proceedings of a Hui Held at 
Hurangi Marae, Turangi" ( 1995) 25 VU WLR 110. 
62 See Report of Submissions - The Crown 's Policy Proposals on Treaty Claims involving Public Works 
Acquisitions, June 1996. 
63 I Macduff"Resources, Rights and Recognition - Negotiating History in Aotearoa/New Zealand" (1995) 19 
Cultural Survival Q 30. 
21 
government in 1996. Several key aspects of the negotiation policy and procedure will be 
discussed below.65 
B Principles 
The recent Treaty of Waitangi jurisprudence has tended to look past the Treaty itself and 
has focused on "the principles of the Treaty". This is the wording used in the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975, and thus dates from the beginning of the modem grievance settlement 
process. Such an approach can be criticised both by those who see it as creating 
unwarranted legal rights from a political document which should be relegated to history 
texts, as well as those who see the new trend as avoiding the actual guarantees and 
obligations of the Treaty.66 This debate aside, one clearly evident result is that each actor in 
the claims field: the claimants, the courts, the Crown, the Waitangi Tribunal etc has a 
different statement of what those principles are.67 When other principles are included, there 
is great possibility for divergent expectations. 
64 Above n 22, 58. 
65 Coalition Agreement - New Zealand First and the New Zealand National Party, Policy Area: Maori , 6 
December 1996. 
66 See M Jackson "Colonisation as Myth-making - a Case Study in Aotearoa (New Zealand)", cf G Chapman 
"The Treaty of Waitangi - Fertile Ground for Judicial (and Academic) Myth-making" [1991] NZLJ 373. 
67 See for example the summary in M Chen and G Palmer Public law in New Zealand (Oxford University 
Press, Auckland, 1993) 419. 
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The Crown has taken a principled approach in developing its negotiation policy, looking 
both to the Treaty and other considerations. The 1989 document outlined the following 
guiding principles: 
(1) the principle of kawanatanga (government by the Crown); 
(2) the principle of rangatiratanga; 
(3) the principle of equality ( of all New Zealanders before the law); 
( 4) the principle of cooperation; 
(5) the principle of redress 
The commentary in the document suggests that kawanatanga involves sovereignty whereas 
rangatiratanga is self-management inextricably linked to possession of resources and 
taonga. It is understandable that this would be the position of the Crown. However, given 
the current debate on what these terms of the Treaty meant, and what they mean today, such 
a position is far from contentious. The principle of equality also raises problems. This 
principle holds that all New Zealand citizens are equal before the law. As far as article III of 
the Treaty grants Maori the same rights as other citizens, there is no issue. It should 
however be recognised that Article II gave Maori tribes rights to resources which other 
citizens would not have, and so a significant element of difference in rights appears. Indeed, 
the negotiations and even the whole settlement process are largely concerned with the claim 
by Maori to this difference ofrights and the Crown's obligations to uphold it. 
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The 1995 document, which focused on the area of direct negotiations, rather than the 
overall Crown approach towards the Treaty, put forward the following seven principles:68 
(1 ) the Crown explicitly acknowledges historical injustices; 
(2) in attempting to resolve outstanding claims the Crown should not create further 
injustices; 
(3) the Crown has a duty to act in the interests of all New Zealanders; 
( 4) as settlements are to be durable, they must be fair, sustainable, and remove the sense of 
gnevance; 
(5) the resolution process is consistent and equitable between claimant groups; 
(6) nothing in the settlements will remove, restrict or replace Maori rights under Article III 
of the Treaty, including Maori access to mainstream government programmes; 
(7) settlements will take into account fiscal and economic constraints and the ability of the 
Crown to pay compensation 
It will immediately be noted that four of the seven principles (2,3,5 and 7) appear to place 
some constraint on the way the Crown can proceed. Moreover the sixth principle does not 
seem to be directly connected to the claims contemplated which will typically involve 
rights under Article II. 
68 Office of Treaty Settlements Crown Proposals f or the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims - Detailed 
Proposals (1994). 
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Some of the objections to these guiding principles and the policies based on them will be 
outlined below. 
C The Formal Process for Direct Negotiations69 
The Proposals set out four mam stages m the procedure to be followed m direct 
negotiations: 
(1) acceptance onto a Negotiations Work Programme; 
(2) negotiations leading to a draft Deed of Settlement; 
(3) ratification by both parties leading to the signing of a Deed of Settlement; 
( 4) implementation of the settlement. 
1 Acceptance of the claim 
The first step for the claimants involves presenting historical evidence to substantiate their 
claim. Those claimants who already have had their case heard by the Waitangi Tribunal 
will have an advantage. However, even if the Waitangi Tribunal has issued its findings, the 
Crown will still form its own view on these findings . For claims to be accepted onto then 
Negotiations Work programme, the Crown must: 
69 See generally above n 68 . 
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(1) accept that the claims are historically verifiable; 
(2) agree to a position on the nature and extent of the alleged breach; 
(3) accept that the correct claimant group has been identified for the claim area; 
( 4) accept that the claimant negotiators have proper mandate; 
(5) agree that the claim has sufficient priority to be accepted into the Programme, given 
overall settlement policy and financial constraints. 
The claimants, on their part, need to agree to the following: 
(1) to negotiate a final settlement covering the entire claim, unless the Crown agrees to 
make an explicit exception; 
(2) to negotiate knowing that the Crown' s offer of redress will only cover the nature and 
extent of the breach accepted by the Crown; 
(3) during negotiations, to waive all other avenues ofredress available; 
( 4) that a condition of settlement involves the lifting of memorials and other measures to 
ensure finality. 70 
The first part of the process focuses on positions. It even appears to be a formalisation of 
positional bargaining. Despite the fact that claimants have taken the time, and expense. Of 
going through the Waitangi Tribunal, the Crown can still decide to reject the Tribunal ' s 
findings and formulate its own view. While this is problematic for claimants it is some 
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extent understandable given that the Tribunal reports have been criticised for 
exaggeration. 71 Real concern must lie with the condition that the claimants must accept the 
Crown' s position before redress is discussed. Furthermore discussions must focus on the 
entire claim unless the Crown accepts otherwise. While the claimants may be ready to enter 
into direct negotiations, they may be unwilling to do so for a settlement of their entire 
claim. The Tainui settlement for instance, concerned only the raupatu lands, and not other 
tribal claims such as the Waikato River. The reluctance to settle for the entire tribal claim 
can be seen in the recent rejection of the Crown's offer to Whakatohea. 72 
Overall this part of the process appears to give the Crown considerable power in deciding 
whether or not to proceed. It reads less like a formula for encouraging negotiation and more 
like one for guiding position forming . 
2 Negotiating redress 
In this second stage the Crown develops its negotiating brief, based on its positions on the 
nature and extent of the breach .. This may involve the Office of Treaty Settlements having 
preliminary discussions with the claimants, and consultations with interested third parties. 
Once the Crown' s brief has been formulated, negotiations with the claimants as to redress 
70 These memorials affect land coming within the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises act) 1988 as 
mentioned above. 
71 See the comments of W Oliver in " Waitangi Fatigue", above n 8. Strong language by the Waitangi 
Tribunal may in some respect be advantageous to the Crown, see below. 
72 R Berry " Iwi reject $40m land settlement" Sunday Star Times, Auckland, 27 July I 997, A2; 
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are undertaken. The Crown can appoint its negotiators who will likely be lead by the 
Minster in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations or a senior official. 
It would appear that at this stage at least the exchange between Crown and claimants would 
be approaching a more dialogue-oriented style of negotiation. However, even here it has 
been suggested that the process is more akin to a series of ultimata flowing from Cabinet.73 
If this is the case then it may be questioned whether present policy is actually 'negotiation', 
or if the term is simply being used to project a more positive picture of the settlement 
procedure. 
3 Draft Deed of Settlement 
If the negotiations lead to agreement among negotiators, the next stage involves ratification, 
both by the Crown and by the claimants. The Government needs to ensure that there is 
sufficient political support for the settlement, and this may involve approval by Parliament. 
The claimants will engage their own ratification process. The Crown will need to be 
assured that there has been due process and that there is sufficient tribal support to ensure 
settlement durability. Issues of mandate will be discussed below 
Editorial "No mood to settle" The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 29 July 1997, A 12. 
73 Comments by K Ertel on "The Validation, Negotiation and Settlement of Claims" at " In Search of the 
Pathway Forward" Seminar Series, Government Buildings, Wellington 7 October 1996. 
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4 Implementation 
This final stage involves putting the Deed into practice. This primarily involves transfer of 
assets. The Crown needs to be assured that there is a legal body set up which has the 
capability to receive and manage the assets. Having an adequate governance structure is 
important. Problems arise in finding the right structure for such organisations since iwi 
themselves do not have legal personality in New Zealand law. Apart from existing 
structures such as companies, incorporated societies and trust boards, an organisation can 
be created by statute to suit specific needs. 74 
D Limitations 
The Crown's policy imposes certain significant limitations on negotiations and settlements. 
Some of the major ones which caused concern for Maori are outlined below. 
I Fiscal constraints 
A major limitation, which initially accompanied the Crown proposals, was the "fiscal cap" 
of $1 billion for settlement of all Treaty claims. This maximum sum was actually lower 
from the date of policy's announcement since the fisheries settlement of 1992 was to be 
counted against the total as well as the around $1 70 million Tainui settlement were to be 
74 Such as the Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act 1996. 
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subtracted from the total. The sum of $1 billion was declared by the Government to be 
what the country could afford, although no reasoning as to how the sum was arrived at was 
presented. This limitation drew much protest from claimants, particularly those who felt 
that their tribal losses alone amounted to billions of dollars. 
The Coalition Agreement between the New Zealand National Party and the New Zealand 
First Party, which followed the 1996, indicated that the fiscal cap as previously stated 
would no longer form part of official Crown policy. Nevertheless the principles of fiscal 
responsibility and affordability of settlements, as well as consistency among settlements, 
will continue. 
2 Natural resources75 
The "Conservation Estate", lands administered by the Department of Conservation, are not 
readily available for settlements of Treaty claims. The land in question includes, among 
others, national parks, marginal strips and marine reserves. Particular sites of significant 
historical, cultural or spiritual importance could be considered for settlements. It is unlikely 
that full ownership would be transferred except in exceptional circumstances involving 
small discrete parcels of land of very special significance to Maori, although the Crown 
acknowledges the possibility of two other mechanisms - the transfer of title with statutory 
conditions and transferring a significant management role. With the Conservation Estate 
75 Above n 68, 13-24. 
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being viewed as land managed by the Crown on behalf of all New Zealanders, a major 
concern is that levels of management and protection be continued and that public access 
and third party rights be maintained. 
The Crown acknowledges four main types of interest in natural resources: 
(1) ownership interest - which allows all uses and potential uses subject to legal obligations; 
(2) use interest - allowing defined uses of the resource but not all potential ones; 
(3) value interest - spiritual or cultural interest, even if the resource is controlled by others; 
(4) regulatory interest - this refers to the management and control of a resource for the 
common good 
The Crown's position is that under Article II of the Treaty, interests in natural resources are 
use and value interest. Therefore ownership interests based on Article II are not for 
negotiation. Ownership can be claimed if it can be shown that the Crown did not exercise 
its rights to fairly acquire property under Article I, otherwise a fair acquisition of land by 
the Crown is deemed to have extinguished use interests connected to the land. 
The stance of the New Zealand government would appear to differ from that taken in other 
jurisdictions. Wickliffe notes that in Australia, Canada and the United States there is 
acknowledgment of ownership interests in natural resources. 76 Moreover courts in these 
76 Above n 49. 
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countries have accepted that indigenous people have priority of rights as against other users 
where treaty arrangements guarantee rights to use, take or have access to natural resources. 
She also notes that overseas trends illustrate the value of joint management models. 
A claim made by indigenous peoples throughout the world is that under customary laws 
often based on notions of stewardship of the land and other natural resources, the 
environment was protected. It is further claimed that the arrival of Europeans saw 
unsustainable exploitation of natural resources and resultant ecological problems. Now, 
many Europeans are saying that he environment must be protected and are using the 
conservationist stance to deny land and resource right of aboriginal peoples. 77 It is 
understandable that many indigenous people feel frustrated that the colonists responsible 
for most of the destruction can now take the moral high ground of conservation to prevent 
recognition of rights to resources which have economic, historical, and cultural significance 
to the claimants, and which can be used for tribal development, which is often desperately 
needed. 
A prominent New Zealand conservationist has however claimed that while notions of 
kaitiakitanga are important for many Maori , often those who make the decisions concerning 
development of natural resources will be driven more by commercial motives, rather than 
environmental needs. 78 He further claims that the lands retained in the Conservation Estate 
77 F Wilmer The Indigenous Voice in World Politics (Sage Publications, Newbury Park, 1993). 
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are the least suitable for commercial exploitation and that their development cannot be 
undertaken without considerable harm. 
Matters of the Conservation Estate in Treaty claims involve some of the most complicated 
issues given that the resources are owned by the Crown, not privately, while at the same 
time there are powerful third party interests demanding that the Crown retain ownership. 
The government needs to take care to distinguish fact from posturing, both by those using 
the language of conservation for political ends, and by those claiming that no wrong can be 
done under Maori ownership. Given overseas experience, there appears to be value in the 
New Zealand government shifting its stance to one which would allow greater possibility 
for (at least) joint-management arrangements. 
3 Third party interests 
As mentioned above, three underlying principles of the government's position are the 
obligation to govern for the benefit of all New Zealanders, avoiding the creation of new 
injustices, and the protection if third party rights . These conditions strongly limit the scope 
for redress available for settlements, and act to bring parties other than the Crown and 
claimants into the equation. At the most basic level , private property rights will be 
protected. In the case of freehold estates, it is clear that present titles will not be disturbed. 
78 Comments of Kevin Smith in C Archie Maori Sovereignty- The Pakeha Perspective (Hodder Moa Beckett, 
Auckland, l 995) 53. 
33 
It is more complicated in the area of pastoral leases where the government seems obliged to 
pay compensation to leaseholders for transfer of title to iwi.79 In regard to natural resources, 
access and recreational rights of the public are important considerations in any settlement 
arrangements. 
The requirement for settlement consistency among claims means that one iwi cannot 
concentrate solely on the merits of its own case, but must have a strong interest in the 
settlements for other iwi . This measure may lead to fairness across claims, and avoid the 
situation of one iwi feeling aggrieved if they perceived that their settlement was 
proportionately lower than for another. It does however, impose further restrictions before 
negotiations have even begun. It also leaves open the question as to how comparisons are to 
be made. It may not be easy balancing divergent factors such as lands lost, manner of 
disposition, non-territorial rights lost, social and economic development problems. Further 
complications can arise if a new fiscal cap is designated. Certain settlements would have 
been agreed within the framework of a previous fiscal cap, and so depending on whether 
this sum is greater or smaller, one set of claimants may feel that they have been inequitably 
treated. 
79 See C Robertson "How the Taranaki land row began" The Independent, Auckland, 6 September 1996, I O; 
Editorial " Maori lands: The wrong way to put wrongs to right" The independent, Auckland, 9 August 1996, 
I O; R Berry " Reserved land owners heard by government" Sunday Star Times, Auckland, 20 July 1997. 
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4 Completeness and finality of settlement 
As in Canada, the New Zealand government desires to make present settlements complete 
and durable. This is important given that previous attempts at final resolution, mainly 
through monetary awards have not stood the test of time and the claims are again before the 
government. In order to achieve finality it would seem that sufficient compensation would 
have to be paid. This would be unlikely to equal the amount the claimants feel they have 
lost. It would though, need to be sufficient to achieve the government' s aim of removing 
the sense of grievance. Given that there are strong limitations already imposed by the 
government before dialogue even begins, the achievement of this will undoubtedly be 
complicated. 
In accepting the Crown' s offer for settlement, claimants inevitably face a dilemma. On the 
one hand they are keen to obtain resources to enable economic development and self-
reliance of the tribe. On the other had, the channels of claim are officially closed forever 
once they sign the Deed of Settlement.80 Given the history of settlements deemed "final", 
and the concern that present offers may still be inadequate, it is not surprising that there is a 
feeling among some Maori that these settlements are merely interim measures. Many non-
Maori, however, are concerned at the continuation of claims, particularly where 
80 Above n 73. 
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compensation arrangements have been made in the past. Public demand for finality appears 
to have been a primary consideration behind the government's policy in the first place.81 
E Mandate and Representation 
1 Maori mandate 
Issues of mandate are among the most significant in respect to negotiations. To ensure 
effectiveness and durability of settlements the government needs to be sure that it is 
negotiating and settling with the right people. To proceed with negotiations, the claimant 
group must present a Deed of Mandate to the Crown. This Deed needs to define the 
claimant group and describe the claims, including any boundaries for land. The Deed needs 
to state who are the mandated representatives having authority to negotiate and settle with 
the Crown. The Deed needs to describe how authority for the representatives was obtained 
from the people who stand to benefit. In cases where there is dispute or uncertainty as to 
mandate, several options are available: 
(a) voluntary settlement among competing groups; 
(b) ruling by the Maori Land Court; 
81 See DAM Graham "Address by the Minister in Charge of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations" (1995) 25 
VU WLR 232. 
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(c) ruling by the Maori Appellate Court in proceedings before the Waitangi Tribunal; 
( d) legislated settlement. 
There is much dispute among Maori on the question of the level at which negotiations and 
settlements should proceed. Some argue that these should be at a pan-Maori level. This 
view holds that in modern society the tribe has become largely irrelevant. Many Maori live 
outside their rohe, mostly in cities, often unsure of their tribal affiliation. If settlements 
proceed on a tribal basis, many of these people stand to gain nothing. A leading proponent 
of this view, Hon Peter Tapsell, has stated: 82 
There was a time when tribal organisations were useful. .. . For today ' s maJor 
problems you need an organisation which provides for all the people in a region ... .! 
envisage eight or I O regional organisations, each looking after everyone in the area 
whatever their canoe. 
Many Pakeha also voice objections to tribalism, seeing them as divisive,83 a relic of the 
past, and something that throughout the world has disappear with the passage of time. 8-1 
82 Quoted in D McLaughlin "The Maori Burden - Shame of New Zealand" (November 1993) North and 
South 60, 68-69. See also the Comments of Hon Peter Tapsell in Melbourne, above n 20, 63-70. 
83 See the comments of Glyn Clayton in C Archie, above n 78, 33 ; B Skelton "Tribalism no aid to social 
justice" The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 25 June 1997. 
84 See comments of Prof Peter Munz in Archie, above n 78, 93. 
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Global settlement ignores the interests of iwi and hapu - the units which originally held the 
land or other resources being claimed. It also ignores tribal governance structures which 
have a long history, unlike more recent attempts pan-Maori organisations. That success 
with global settlements is not assured is well illustrated by 1992 fisheries settlement. 
Despite eventually putting over half of the national fishing quota under Maori control , this 
settlement continues to cause many legal problems for The Treaty of Waitangi Fisheries 
Commission, the body responsible for the management and distribution of the fisheries 
assets. Sir Tipene O'Regan is one of the leading proponents of the view that the iwi is the 
proper level at which to conduct negotiations.85 He claims: 86 
Tribe is essentially about kin groups and commonly owned assets whereas race is 
essentially the handmaiden of welfare and a useful device used by the state to 
distinguish us from Pakeha. Jt is only Pakeha and the Crown identifying us all as 
Maori which makes us Maori. 
For O'Regan the single biggest Treaty breach, which continues to this day, was the 
systematic and intentional destruction of the legal personality of the tribe. 87 He claims that 
the emphasis should be on rights, in this context the rights to resources by the body that 
85 TO ' Regan "A Ngai Tahu Perspective on Some Treaty Questions" ( 1995) 25 VU WLR 179. 
86 Quoted in Melbourne, above n 20, 154-155. 
87 Above n 85, 185 . 
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held them - the tribe. Discussion concerning urban Maori often focuses on notions such as 
fairness and equity, which O'Regan opposes as bases for treaty settlements.88 
From the Crown' s perspective it would certainly be easier to deal with one or several large 
bodies, rather than a large number of small ones. The Minster in Charge of Treaty of 
Waitangi Negotiations has expressed the desire for the establishment of a kaumatua 
council.89 As mentioned above, one stream of Maori thought rejects this type of "unite and 
rule" approach. There is then some irony in the criticism of other commentators that, 
through mechanisms such as the fiscal cap and binding settlements for the entire claim, the 
Crown is creating an environment which encourages strong division among Maori groups.90 
However the government has expressed the preference for Maori to be responsible for heir 
own affairs rather than to have decisions imposed by the Crown,91 and clearly desires 
claimant groups to sort out out any conflicts before negotiations. 
88 Above n 85 , 185 . 
89 Above n 81 , 236. 
90 An example, albeit somewhat difficult to follow, can be found in L Watson "The Negotiation of Treaty of 
Waitangi Claims: An Issue Ignored" ( 1996) 8 Otago LR 613 . 
91 Above n 81. 
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2 The Crown's mandate 
Mandate is not only of concern to claimant negotiators. The government faces strong 
political and fiscal constraints in respect to settlements. Many taxpayers object to having to 
pay for the Crown's errors and injustices of the past.92 The government therefore needs to 
feel that the level of opposition to its policy is not so high as to discredit it. These pressures 
will act to restrict the dollar value and the types of resources available for settlements . This 
is clearly reflected in the Crown' s proposals. It also appears that the government feels that 
settlements must final if non-Maori are going to support them.93 
As mentioned above, the courts play an important role in both declaring the Crown's legal 
obligations and shaping public perceptions. It was observed that court rulings in favour of 
claimants can both legitimise the claims in the public eye, and cause some form of back-
lash. Although it is difficult to draw definite conclusions as to public perceptions, a court 
order can certainly be regarded as giving the Crown mandate to proceed with negotiations. 
The Waitangi Tribunal also plays a role in influencing public perceptions. A good example 
is the extremely exaggerated wording in parts of the report on the Taranaki claim. This may 
have given the Minister in charge of Treaty of W aitangi negotiations the backing he needed 
to proceed with compensation negotiations. 
92 Above n 53 . 
93 Above n 81 , 234-5 . 
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IV CROSS-CULTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
A Cross-Cultural Negotiations 
Critical to the settlements process is the fact that Treaty of Waitangi negotiations take place 
in a cross-cultural context. This situation creates considerable potential for 
misunderstanding and thus negotiating difficulties. There are claims that for years Maori 
and Pakeha have been ' talking past each other' 94 and that this is continuing in Maori -
Crown negotiations. Often this relates directly to resources. As mentioned above, the 
Crown recognises the second article of the Treaty as conferring use and value interests to 
Maori for natural resources, while Maori would view this as imparting ownership interests. 
This can be taken even further in looking at concepts of property. The European view of 
property rights is quite different from the concepts of relationship to ancestral lands of 
Maori customary law. 
Communication problems can appear not only due to differences between Maori and 
Pakeha, but also due to the fact that claimants must deal with the government which could 
be described as having its own "culture" complete with peculiar terminology, accountability 
94 J Metge and P Kinloch Talking Past Each Other - Problems of Cross-Cultural Communication (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington , 1984). 
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structures etc. Lack of familiarity with the processes and language of government create 
further potential for misunderstanding and can disempower claimants.
95 
While a substantial examination of the role of culture in negotiations is beyond the scope of 
this paper, it is necessary to mention some of the possible implications from cultural 
difference. Janosik outlines four basic approaches toward culture taken in the negotiation 
literature:96 
( 1) culture as learned behaviour; 
(2) culture as shared value; 
(3) culture as dialectic; 
( 4) culture in context. 
The first approach is pragmatic and accuracy of results has much to do with the reliability 
and sensitivity of the observer. The primary focus is on "etiquette" . The second approach 
involves searching for central cultural values or norms which distinguish a group, and 
subsequently predicting how a person will behave due to these values. While the second 
approach assumes a homogeneity in a culture's dominant value or value set, analysts are 
faced with the complications of individual variation and change over time. The third 
approach can accommodate this. It can also handle conflicting value ideals in society. The 
fourth approach is multi-causal, holding that while culture is important, it is not the only 
95 Above n 73 . 
96 RJ Janosik "Rethinking the Culture-Negotiation Link" 3 Negotiation Jnl 385. 
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factor. Aspects such as age, gender, the negotiating environment need to be considered, and 
often these will be more influential on a person' s behaviour than culture itself. 
While simpler views of culture may be more readily applicable by negotiators they run the 
risk of oversimplification. It is certainly dangerous to view a person' s cultural background 
as being deterministic of his or her behaviour. A more appropriate description of culture is 
that of a framework of symbols and values within which particular individuals and groups 
navigate in staking out their own positions and defining their own interests. Trying to 
define a Maori approach may not be as useful as looking at approaches within each iwi or 
hapu. Similarly, there is considerable variation in organisational culture from one 
government department to the next. Appreciation of an interlocutor' s culture is ultimately a 
poor substitute for understanding his beliefs and behavioural pattems.97 
In negotiations between indigenous peoples and states it should be noted that the parties 
have often dealt with each other over an extended period of time. In New Zealand this is 
particularly important since the majority of the Maori population live in urban areas and are 
very familiar with "Pakeha culture". Indeed many will be more familiar with cultural 
elements of non-Maori origin. The Crown likewise is not dealing with people from another 
country and has a history of dealing with Maori claims. Maori civil servants and politicians 
play a key role in formulating Crown policy, just as Pakeha advisors will be critical for the 
claimants. The approach of culture as a dialectic may be extended in this situation as over 
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the course of New Zealand history both Maori and Pakeha have influenced each other' s 
cultures. 
Given the above analytical limitations, culture does have the potential to pervade the entire 
communication process. Even the very elements of negotiation, including notions of 
' conflict ', ' time ', and ' agreement' may be viewed through entirely different metaphors.98 
While it is readily acknowledged that a negotiation model which is evidently culture-
specific should not be applied in its entirety to cross-cultural dialogue, it may also be 
impossible to have one single "culturally sensitive" model which can apply across all 
contexts. If this is correct, then the first stage in cross-cultural conflict resolution should 
involve creating a mutually acceptable approach to negotiations. Current thinking in the 
field of dispute resolution suggests that process should be a key consideration and that if a 
negotiation is perceived to be a series of agreements, then agreement on process is a 
important step. 
97 P Salem "Conflict, Culture and Negotiation in Natural Resource Bargaining" (1995) 19 Cultural Survival 
Q, 77. 
98 See GO Faure "Conflict Formulation and Going Beyond Culture-Bound Views of Conflict" in 88 Bunker 
and JZ Rubin (eds) Conflict, Cooperation and Justice: Essays inspired by the Work of Morton Deutsch 
(Jossey-Bass, 1995) 41 . 
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B Finality and Time 
As mentioned above government policy demands that negotiations lead to full and final 
settlement. Statements form the government had also indicated the intention to settle all 
outstanding claims by 2000, 99 although more recently the expected completion date seems to 
have shifted to 2010. '00 It could be possible to conclude that the government views the 
settlements process as something finite which it would like to complete and put behind it. The 
Crown perspective may, however, be more complex than this. In 1995 the Minster in Charge 
of Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations stated at a conference entitled "Treaty Claims: the 
Unfinished Business" :101 
I am not sure that we ' ll ever finish in that sense. I am not certain I want it to. It is not 
a matter of reaching some conclusion, as the prime Minister said, closing the book 
and putting it to one side - forgetting about the rest. 
More recent comments of the Minister of Maori Affairs seem to complement such a stance:102 
99 C Davis The Crown's Development of its Proposals f or the Settlement of Treaty of Waitangi Claims and 
Negotiating with !wi LLM Research Paper, Advanced Negotiation, Law Faculty, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1996, 30. 
10° Comments of Hon D Graham in " Waitangi fatigue", above n 8. 
101 Above n 81 , 232. 
102 T Garner "Henare urges Maori to shape their future" The New Zealand Herald, Auckland, 8 August 1997. 
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Maori should not rush into settlements with the Crown. It takes as long as it takes. 
People have to be confident in the knowledge that what they are doing is for the right 
reasons, not because there might not be any money next year. 
A commonly expressed Maori view is that desire for finality is inconsistent with Crown's 
Treaty obligation, acknowledged by the courts and the Waitangi tribunal, to participate in an 
ongoing partnership. 103 Firstly it should be noted that the government is not proposing to 
extinguish Treaty rights. As noted by Ertel the settlement process is concerned with 
compensating wrongs, not buying rights - something which would have a completely different 
price structure. '0~ Furthermore, various opinions form Maori leaders express the desire to 
obtain the assets from settlements and to move down the path of tribal development rather 
than dwelling on grievances. '05 There is a strong sense that the government cannot help iwi to 
succeed and that Maori, having obtained the resources, will achieve on their own. 
One commentator, however, has suggested that there is a completely different view among 
some Maori holding that: "the grievance is more valuable than any practical settlement." 106 
Time taken for settlements is also a point of contention. Crown policy is open to criticism that 
it is being unreasonable in wanting all claims settled in such a short space of time. Aspects 
103 C Wickliffe " Issues for Indigenous Claims Settlement Policies Arising in Other Jurisdictions" ( 1995) 25 
YUWLR 204, 214. 
104 Above n 73. 
ws Comments ofT O' Regan on "The Nature of the Settlement Interchange" at " In Search of the Pathway 
Forward" Seminar Series, Government Buildings, Wellington 21 October 1996; comments of R Mahuta in 
"Treaty fatigue", above n 8. 
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such as greater consultation in developing policy, developing a mutually acceptable 
negotiating process, spreading compensation payments over many years, all require the 
Crown to stop considering a completion date and possibly to look at the settlements process 
as open-ended. While such suggestions would probably improve the settlements process, it 
should be remembered that the Crown was under pressure form Maori frustrated that the 
claims process, primarily through the Waitangi Tribunal, was too slow. 107 
It would appear that the Crown's desire for swiftness and finality is not as simple as 
sometimes claimed. Maori likewise are not all desirous of a slow, meticulous process. 
Whatever shape the claims process takes, Treaty rights will continue, and so it is necessary to 
distinguish between finality in settlement of historical grievances from the Crown's ongoing 
Treaty obligations. 
C Imbalance of Power 
Power imbalance between the parties is often an issue in negotiations since such an imbalance 
can have considerable impact on the process and outcome. This can be contrasted to the 
courtroom or other tribunals where strict procedural rules and a neutral arbiter can mitigate the 
effects of power differences between the parties. In the Crown-claimant bargaining situation a 
strong imbalance of power becomes apparent. Munro notes: 108 
106 See "No mood to settle" , above n 72. 
107 Above n 61 , 12. 
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The Crown wields control over the negotiation process; it has skilled and 
experienced advisors and negotiators; and it can, for the most part, pick when and on 
what terms it wants to negotiate, and whether or not to settle. Maori are in a 
comparatively weak position . They have few human and financial resources; they 
cannot enter into negotiations without a measure of political largesse or as a result of 
judicial favour; and are often unable to walk away from a settlement, either because 
their needs are pressing, or for fear that, without settlement, the Crown will act or 
omit to act so as to prejudice Maori interests. 
Davis claims that the act of publishing the Proposals exemplified the Crown's power over 
lwi. 109 It could thus set the agenda and influence public opinion towards its views. It could 
even be said that the Crown was presenting the "Proposals" as a fait accompli to Maori. The 
fact that the thinking contained in the Proposals continues to guide the government's approach 
may lend credibility to this argument. 
It is possible that the Crown is transplanting its 'culture of ruling' to negotiations with Maori. 
Davis states: 11 0 
108 J Munro The Treaty of Waitangi and the Seaford Deal LLM Research Paper, Faculty of Law, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 1993 , 21 
109 Above n 99, 17. 
110 Above n 99, 13 . 
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Rather than enter into meaningful consultation with Maori about possible options for 
a process of settling Treaty claims the Government took a course of action altogether 
consistent with its culture of ruling. Firstly , it geared the development of its 
Proposals in such a way that they were agreeable to the majority of the population 
and in that sense less of a political risk. Secondly, the Government developed these 
Proposals in isolation from the wider Maori community which enabled it to release 
them to the voting public with the clear message that they in fact represented the 
Crown's preferred view on the boundaries of settling Treaty claims. 
Macduff observes that the Crown now finds itself in an unfamiliar position in that it is not 
exercising its directive authority, but is negotiating about rights. The Crown's experience in 
this area is quite limited. 111 
While most of the academic literature on the Treaty of Waitangi appears to accuse the 
Crown of abuse of its power in some manner, the fact remains that the government is 
pursuing a comprehensive claims settlement programme. This may beg the question as to 
why it is involved in this process at all. That the courts have obliged the Crown to recognise 
certain obligation does not provide a sufficient answer since the Crown is undertaking more 
than can be required by necessarily specific court orders. Maori, like other nations of the 
"fourth world", have none of the usual power bases which could influence governments, 
such as wealth, military strength or overwhelming numbers. Wilmer poses the question: 
111 I Macduff "The Role ofNegotiation: Negotiated Justice" (1995) 25 VUWLR 144, 147. 
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"Could the emergence of indigenous activism suggest that moral suasion is an element of 
influence in the process of the twentieth century global political discourse?" .11 2 I would 
suggest that this could be answered in the affirmative for national as well as international 
politics. In the present age, moral suasion presents a real factor influencing governments 
and public opinion. It could be argued that the claim of powerlessness by Maori could give 
them a very real source of power - sufficient power to make the state do that which it would 
not do in the past in terms of acknowledging rights. 
D What Are We Negotiating About? 
The primary focus of the Crown's policy documents appears to be physical resources -
whether land or other assets. It is likely, however, that the bargaining also concerns less 
tangible matters. Macduff comments that the bargaining also deals with identity.11 3 The 
growing status being accorded to the Treaty is reshaping the role of Maori in New Zealand 
society and in the political and constitutional spheres. Direct negotiations with the Crown 
are an integral part of this process. While much public opinion argues for universality of 
rights, the dialogue between the Crown and Maori emphasises the differences in rights 
based on identity. In Treaty of Waitangi terms, the negotiations focus on the second article 
guarantees to rangatira, rather than third article rights granted to all British Subjects (now 
New Zealand citizens). 
112 Above n 77, 14. 
113 Above n 111 , 144. 
50 
That there is more at stake than merely assets is clearly illustrated by the Deed of 
Settlement between the Crown and Tainui.
114 Of great symbolic importance in the Tainui 
settlement was the apology from the Crown. In respect to issues if identity, such an apology 
may be even more significant than monetary compensation. In the most formal way the 
Crown has acknowledged wrongful action on its part. In so doing it reinforces the link with 
the "Crown" which committed those acts, with the ancestors of the Tainui people today, as 
well as the relationship over the years between the two parties. 
The Tainui Deed of Settlement also links te tino rangatiratanga to the issues of assets. 
While government policy in New Zealand is more hostile towards recognising a notion of 
Maori sovereignty than in comparable jurisdictions, the issue is gradually coming to the 
fore. If tribal organisation is strong, and the tribe is successful in claiming resources, 
particularly tribal lands, from the Crown which recognises its second article rights, then the 
intellectual step to consideration of sovereignty is not as great as may initially be thought. 
The very fact that the Crown is entering into negotiations with another body is itself 
indicative of a status of that interlocutor. While it is inevitable to have power and other 
imbalances in a real-world bargaining situation, negotiation presupposes aformal equality 
between the parties. As mentioned above, however, the extent to which the Crown is 
actually involved in ' negotiation' rather than a process which merely uses the term for 
114 See the Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995 . 
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public relations value is open to discussion. Nevertheless, the fact the Crown is willing to 
label these activities "negotiations" is itself significant. There is possible indication that 
through this process the Crown is acknowledging that its sovereignty is not as unitary as 
commonly thought. The dialogue primarily about assets, could thus been seen as a dialogue 
which touches on the country 's constitution. 
Despite the above considerations of sovereignty, the usefulness of "sovereignty m the 
modern context may be limited. Geoffrey Palmer states the following: 11 5 
[T]he idea that sovereignty should be given to Maori at a time when the notions 
of sovereignty are collapsing all over the world seems to me to be ludicrous. Once 
upon a time, we thought the New Zealand Government was sovereign. We hardly 
think that now. Far from being the indivisible omnipotent concept that Hobbes 
made it in Leviathan, sovereignty is more like a piece of chewing gum . It can be 
stretched and pulled in many directions to do almost anything. Sovereignty is not a 
word that is useful and it ought to be banished from political debate . The notion 
that sovereignty for Maori comes from the Treaty of Waitangi is highly 
controversial and requires reading one provision of the Treaty up and another one 
down. 
Considerable academic debate continues as to what "te tino rangatiratanga" meant to the 
rangatira who signed the Treaty. Such discussion, however, is likely to remain in the realm 
115 G Palmer "Where to From Here?" ( 1995) VU WLR 243. 
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of theory. It is the outcome of the negotiations between Maori and the Crown that will 
show what this means in this age. The full effects may not be felt for some years after 
settlements have been implemented and iwi have regained the path of development 
interrupted by years of colonial neglect of their rights. The Maori voices of are heard in 
negotiations with the Crown, the more their voices will be heard in defining and building 
the state. 
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V CONCLUSIONS 
Due to the strong interconnections among the institutions involved in Treaty of Waitangi 
settlements it is necessary to see how the outcomes in one can impact upon proceedings in 
another. A Maori group may need to take their claim through a number of these institutions 
before the claim can be resolved to their satisfaction. 
The Waitangi Tribunal is a specialised institution which produces thoroughly researched 
reports, and which has reasonable scope in its recommendations. It is limited by the fact 
that for the most part it has recommendation power only, and in those fields where its 
recommendations are binding there are strong political pressures restricting their exercise. 
A Waitangi Tribunal report will often serve as the basis for the groups claim in direct 
negotiations. In recent times the Tribunal has indicated that it is willing to produce reports 
that in terms of wording may compromise accepted academic objectivity in order to 
strongly affect public opinion and thus give the Crown mandate for settlements. 
The courts have played a highly significant role during the last decade in giving legitimacy 
to claims. Judgments in favor of Maori plaintiffs have recognised the Crown' s legal 
obligations in respect to the Treaty and have forced he Crown to negotiate where previously 
it felt it had no need to do so. Nevertheless, the courts can offer little in the way of direct 
substantive results. The process and outcomes reached are also limited since only legal 
rights and remedies are applicable. It would appear that some negative effects of litigation, 
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notably the adversarial mindset, carry through to negotiations where they may actually 
impede mutually beneficial results being reached. 
While the potential scope for remedial legislation is unlimited, it's importance in the claims 
process is limited to a few key areas. Its main function is to make into law negotiated 
agreements reached between the Crown and Maori. 
The Crown's aim is to reach settlements which are durable and which remove the sense of 
grievance, while being fair to the whole country. This paper has shown that there are a 
number of criticisms which can be leveled at the Crown's policy and the way it has been 
presented to Maori. The policy appears to formalise positional bargaining, and, from the 
very start, restrict negotiations in a number of areas. This would appear to work against the 
very advantages that make negotiation suitable for resolving grievances, including 
flexibility in processes and outcomes. 
As discussed in this paper, the cross-cultural context has a significant effect on the 
negotiations, not only because it involves Pakeha talking to Maori, but also because 
claimants are talking to government. Cultural differences may impact upon people's 
interpretation of key issues involved and so raise considerable possibility for 
misunderstanding. Also the government's "culture of ruling" may mean that it has some 
difficulty in engaging in true negotiation which rejects imposition of solutions in favour of 
formally equal parties working towards agreement. There may even be some question as to 
whether the Crown is engaging in "negotiations" at all. 
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It is important to note that the negotiations between Maori and the Crown take on a greater 
significance than merely discussions about resources and assets. There is an underlying 
dialogue which concerns issues of identity. In negotiating with the Crown the claimants 
assert their identity as tangata whenua and as Treaty partners. The Crown is more than the 
government of the day, but rather the same Crown which signed the Treaty of Waitangi 
and which failed to fulfill its Treaty obligations in many instances. Further to issues of 
identity are issues of constitutional significance. By entering into negotiations with iwi, the 
Crown is acknowledging that iwi have a dialogue status in respect to Treaty rights which is 
higher than that of other citizens dealing with the state. 
Despite numerous criticisms aimed at the government's Treaty policies, considerable 
progress has been made over recent years, and more will likely be made in the near future . 
Negotiated settlements have given some iwi a considerable resources base which they can 
use for future development. The period of the greatest influence of litigation and the 
Waitangi Tribunal are probably over. It is likely that direct negotiations will be the most 
important Treaty settlement mechanism in the coming years. It is submitted that the Crown 
will need to alter its approach in order to achieve "negotiated justice" . Moreover, while 
there is likely to be a measure of finality in the settlement of historical claims, it is doubtful 
whether the Crown' s obligations will cease completely once the settlements have been 
implemented. Ultimately only time will tell how successful the government and Maori have 
been in resolving Treaty of Waitangi grievances. 
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1 
1 
I 
hapu 
hui 
iwi 
kaitiakitanga 
kaumatua 
kawa 
kawanatanga 
marae 
manuhiri 
rangatira 
raupatu 
rohe 
taonga 
tangata whenua 
GLOSSARY OF MAORI WORDS 
kin group, sub-tribe 
meeting, gathering 
people, tribe 
guardianship, stewardship 
elder 
custom, protocol 
governance, government 
traditional village 
visitors, guests 
chief 
confiscation 
tribal district, boundary 
treasures, possessions, assets 
original inhabitants of an area, iwi/hapu with customary rights over 
an area 
tino rangatiratanga highest chieftainship, self-determination, independence, 
sovereignty 
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